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This week in cyber: attackers went after the tools small businesses depend on

Cybersecurity · Nov 13, 2026

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Scarlet Risk graphic: "This week in cyber, for small teams"

The biggest security stories of the past ten days had one thing in common: attackers went after the tools companies use to manage everything else. The remote-access software MSPs use to support their clients. The management server that pushes updates to every laptop. The app keys that let cloud software talk to Microsoft 365. And the vendors that quietly hold your data. If you run a small team with no security hire, you may not have picked these tools, but you depend on them. Here's what happened, in plain words, and what to do about each one this week.

A note on labels: "confirmed by" means the company or agency said it publicly. "Reported by" means an established security outlet or research firm reported it.

1. Rogue remote-access installs spread through MSP ScreenConnect accounts

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Confirmed by ConnectWise. Reported by Huntress, Blackpoint Cyber and BleepingComputer.

On November 11, attackers used access to cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect accounts belonging to managed service providers to push extra, attacker-controlled copies of ScreenConnect onto customer computers. ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and disabled five third-party extensions in about 400 partner environments as a precaution, while saying the initial access method was still unconfirmed. At the time of BleepingComputer's report, Huntress was tracking six compromised MSPs and 286 affected endpoints across 47 organizations.

Blackpoint Cyber's writeup of the toolkit, called SCKit, found it also tries to attack the technician who connects to an infected machine, using a technique tied to CVE-2026-84869, a ScreenConnect client flaw ConnectWise patched in September (version 26.6.5). Blackpoint's test against a current client did not succeed, and it did not see that step work during the campaign.

What to do:

  • Ask your MSP, in writing: Do you use ScreenConnect on our machines? Are your clients on 26.6.5 or later? Did you have any of the disabled extensions installed, and have you reviewed your Run Command history?
  • Put your IT provider's remote-access tool on your vendor list, with an owner and the date you last asked about it.
  • If you run ScreenConnect yourself, look for ScreenConnect clients you didn't install, and don't open an interactive session to a machine you suspect is infected. ConnectWise advises using a separate tool to investigate.

2. N-able N-central: emergency patches, then new exploits within days

Patches and guidance confirmed by N-able. Exploitation reported by BleepingComputer, citing Huntback and Previdian.

N-central is another remote monitoring and management platform MSPs use to run client devices. After a researcher published more than 30 alleged flaws, N-able took hosted N-central offline and released hotfix 2026.4 HF2. N-able's update tells on-premises customers to upgrade and keep servers off the internet until patched, and tells all customers to upgrade agents and probes.

On November 12 the same researcher released two new exploits. BleepingComputer reported that one of them, which needs the Legacy API turned on, was used within hours to take over at least 21 N-central servers to mine cryptocurrency, 19 of them running the new hotfix, according to Huntback. N-able said it had seen no signs of compromise from the new flaws, disabled its Intune integration as a precaution, and told customers to make sure Legacy API is off (it is off by default).

What to do:

  • If your MSP uses N-central, ask whether their server is on HF2, whether Legacy API is off, and whether the agents on your machines were updated.
  • If you host N-central yourself, follow N-able's advisory and check the indicators in BleepingComputer's report. If you find them, treat the whole server as compromised.
  • Two of this week's biggest stories were MSP tools. Your provider's tooling belongs on your vendor list.

3. Leaked app keys used to sign in to Microsoft 365 and Azure

Confirmed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. Also reported by Huntress, Blackpoint Cyber and N-able.

Microsoft says that from as early as October 28, an attacker used valid application credentials, such as client secrets, to sign in to Microsoft Entra ID as "service principals," the identities apps use to reach your data without a person logging in. Some of those secrets had been left in public GitHub code. In some cases a vendor-owned app's credential was compromised and used to reach several customer tenants. Once in, the attacker went after more secrets in Azure Key Vault and storage, and accessed SharePoint, OneDrive and mailbox items. Microsoft says AI tools were used to search GitHub for secrets, and in one case went from that search to stealing Key Vault data in five minutes.

Because these are app sign-ins, user MFA doesn't stop them. Huntress and N-able flagged the same activity across MSPs and the customer tenants they manage.

What to do:

  • Open the list of apps connected to your Microsoft 365 (in the Entra admin center, App registrations and Enterprise applications). Disable anything nobody can explain.
  • Rotate client secrets that are old, have no owner, or ever sat in code. Deleting the file doesn't cancel the key; only rotating it does.
  • Ask your MSP or developer to review service principal sign-in logs back to October 28 against the indicators Microsoft published.

4. An AI provider's breach exposed Notion AI chats

Confirmed by Notion and Fireworks AI. Reported by BleepingComputer.

Notion said a breach at Fireworks AI, one of its AI infrastructure providers, exposed Notion AI chat transcripts used for an admin Insights feature in a small number of workspaces, which Notion puts at under 1% of users. Fireworks confirmed on November 8 that customer data had been accessed. Notion cut off traffic to the provider, disabled the feature, and told affected users to rotate any passwords, API keys or other credentials typed into those chats.

What to do:

  • For each AI tool your team uses, write down which outside providers process your data. Many publish a subprocessor list.
  • Make "no passwords, keys or customer data in AI chats" a written rule, not a hope.
  • If you received a notice from Notion, follow it and rotate anything shared in chats.

5. Vendors' platforms leaked their clients' data

Confirmed by Baker Tilly and SEGA. Reported by BleepingComputer.

Accounting and advisory firm Baker Tilly is notifying clients that data stored on a platform run by an unnamed third-party provider was taken. BleepingComputer notes the Texas Attorney General's portal lists Social Security numbers among the exposed data. Separately, SEGA said a breach at its newsletter provider, ARARA, exposed 2.2 million subscriber email addresses. ARARA said its breach affected nearly 380 corporate clients. In both cases, the breach was at a vendor, not on the company's own network.

What to do:

  • Rank your vendors by the data they hold. Payroll, accounting, email marketing and file sharing usually top the list.
  • For your top five, know who to call and how they would tell you about a breach.
  • Delete old exports and contact lists sitting in tools you no longer use.

6. Patch Outlook, Chrome and Barracuda email gateways

Confirmed by CISA.

On November 10, CISA added six actively exploited vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, including flaws in Microsoft Outlook, Google Chromium (the engine under Chrome and Edge) and Barracuda Email Security Gateway.

What to do:

  • Make sure Chrome, Edge and Office update automatically, and that people actually restart.
  • If you or your MSP run a Barracuda email gateway, ask for confirmation it's patched.

If you only do three things this week

  1. Ask your MSP four questions: which remote-access and management tools run on your machines, whether they're patched, whether anyone has checked for installs nobody approved, and how you would hear if something went wrong.
  2. Review the apps connected to Microsoft 365 and rotate any secret you can't account for.
  3. Write down your top five vendors by the data they hold, with an owner for each.

Where Scarlet fits

Most of this week's stories weren't attacks aimed at a small company directly. They hit the tools and vendors small companies depend on. Scarlet helps lean teams keep their vendor list, risk register and policies in one place, so "who has our data, and who owns this?" has an answer before the next headline. It doesn't scan for or block attacks. It helps you keep track of what to fix and who owns it.

Start here: Get your free Risk Snapshot. It's always free and takes about three minutes. Or try Scarlet Pro free for 14 days, no card needed.

Pete Macias, Founder, Scarlet Risk

Sources

See your biggest risk gaps in 3 minutes. Get your free Risk Snapshot.

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